

**The 2003 Philip C. Jessup  
International Law Moot Court Competition**

Republic of Annolay

v.

Republic of Reston

*The Case Concerning The Women and Children of the Civil War*

**BEST OVERALL MEMORIAL – RESPONDENT**

**First Place  
Richard R. Baxter Award**

**Bond University  
Australia (Team #861)**



# CASE CONCERNING THE WOMEN AND CHILDREN OF THE CIVIL WAR

<u>TABLE OF CONTENTS</u> .....	<u>I</u>
<u>INDEX OF AUTHORITIES</u> .....	<u>III</u>
<u>STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION</u> .....	<u>XV</u>
<u>STATEMENT OF FACTS</u> .....	<u>XVI</u>
<u>QUESTIONS PRESENTED</u> .....	<u>XIX</u>
<u>SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS</u> .....	<u>XX</u>

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

<u>PLEADINGS</u> .....	<u>1</u>
<b>I. RESTON IS NOT INTERNATIONALLY LIABLE FOR THE TREATMENT OF CASCADIAN WOMEN DURING THE CIVIL WAR</b> .....	<b>1</b>
A. ANNOLAY HAS NO STANDING TO BRING THE ACTION.....	1
B. ALTERNATIVELY, RESTON ACTED CONSISTENTLY WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW REGARDING THE TREATMENT OF CASCADIAN WOMEN.....	3
1. No obligations <i>erga omnes</i> may be invoked on the facts .....	3
a. The wartime rapes did not constitute genocide.....	3
b. No other obligation <i>erga omnes</i> applies .....	4
2. In any event, Reston did not breach any obligation <i>erga omnes</i> .....	5
a. Reston did not breach any obligation prohibiting the wartime rapes .....	5
b. Reston did not breach any obligation requiring it to prevent the wartime rapes ....	6
c. Reston did not breach any obligation requiring it to prosecute the wartime rapes .	7
C. IN ANY EVENT, RESTON IS NOT REQUIRED TO MAKE REPARATIONS TO ANNOLAY.....	8

<b>II. ANNOLAY BREACHED INTERNATIONAL LAW WITH RESPECT TO THE TREATMENT OF CASCADIAN WOMEN IN ANNOLAY.....</b>	<b>9</b>
A. RESTON HAS STANDING TO ASSERT BREACHES OF OBLIGATIONS TO PROTECT THE CASCADIAN BROTHEL WORKERS.....	9
B. ANNOLAY BREACHED ITS OBLIGATION TO RESPECT AND ENSURE FREEDOM FROM SLAVERY .....	10
C. THE CASCADIAN WOMEN WERE UNDER NO OBLIGATION TO EXHAUST LOCAL REMEDIES	13
<b>III. RESTON IS ENTITLED TO EXERCISE UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION OVER FRED SCHMANDEFARE .....</b>	<b>14</b>
A. RESTON MAY EXERCISE UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION OVER CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY ..	14
B. TRAFFICKING FOR THE PURPOSE OF SEXUAL SLAVERY IS A CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY .	14
C. RESTON MAY EXERCISE UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION OVER FRED SCHMANDEFARE <i>IN ABSENTIA</i> .....	16
<b>IV. RESTON HAS ACTED CONSISTENTLY WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW WITH RESPECT TO THE BRIBERY AND NEED NOT MAKE RESTITUTION.....</b>	<b>16</b>
A. ANNOLAY’S UNCLEAN HANDS RENDER THIS ACTION INADMISSABLE .....	16
B. RESTON ACTED CONSISTENTLY WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW WITH RESPECT TO THE BRIBERY .....	18
1. The conduct of the Restonian border officials is not attributable to Reston.....	18
2. Reston has upheld the object and purpose of the Regional Anti-Corruption Convention [RACC] .....	19
3. Reston has fulfilled its obligation to exercise due diligence to protect the rights of aliens within its territory .....	19
4. There is no customary law to prevent the bribery of public officials .....	20
5. Reston satisfied any obligation to prevent violations of children’s rights.....	21
C. RESTON IS NOT OBLIGATED TO MAKE REPARATIONS TO ANNOLAY .....	22
<b><u>CONCLUSION AND PRAYER FOR RELIEF.....</u></b>	<b><u>23</u></b>

## INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

### Case, Advisory Opinion and Arbitral Decisions

<i>A v UK</i> 27 EHRR 611 .....	12
<i>Advisory Opinion on Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights</i> 1999, ICJ (Apr. 29).....	13
<i>Akayesu</i> Case No ICTR-96-4 (Sept. 2, 1998).....	4
<i>Altesor v Uruguay</i> (1982) 70 I.L.R. 248.....	13
<i>Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case</i> (U.K. v. Nor.) ICJ Rep. (1951).....	11
<i>Attorney General of Israel v Eichmann</i> 36 I.L.R. 277 (Sup.Ct. Israel 1962).....	13, 14
<i>Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago and Lennox Phillip</i> No. 2 (1995), 1 AC 396.....	8
<i>Azanian Peoples Org.</i> (4) SALR 690.....	7
<i>Barcelona Traction, Light &amp; Power Company, Limited</i> (Second Phase)(Belg. v. Spain) 1970 ICJ 3.....	2,8,9
<i>Bensley</i> 3 MOORE’S 3018.....	18
<i>Border Guards Prosecution</i> 100 I.L.R. 366.....	8
<i>Boyd</i> 4 RIAA 380 (Mex.-U.S. 1928).....	20
<i>Caire</i> 5 RIAA 516 (Fr. – Mex. 1929).....	18
<i>Campos-Guardado v I/S AND O/S</i> 484 U.S. 826 (1987).....	3,5
<i>Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000</i> (the Congo v. Belg.) ICJ General list No.21, Feb. 14 2002.....	16
<i>Castelain</i> 3 MOORE’S 2999 (U.S. – Fr. 1880).....	18
<i>Chapman</i> 4 RIAA 632 (Mex.-U.S. 1930).....	20
<i>Chorzów Factory</i> (Germ. v. Pol.)(Merits) 1927 PCIJ, (ser. A), No. 9. ....	8,17,22
<i>Cibich</i> 4 RIAA 57 (Mex. – U.S. 1926).....	13,20
<i>Clément Kayishema &amp; Obed Ruzindana</i> Case No. ICTR-95-1-T.....	3,4

<i>Confederate Debt</i> 3 MOORE 2900 (U.S. – U.K. 1871).....	5
<i>Confederate States</i> 3 MOORE 2886 (U.S. – Mex. 1868).....	5
<i>Corfu Channel</i> (U.K. v. Alban.)(Assessment of Compensation)(244) ICJ Rep. 1949.....	23
<i>Cyprus v Turkey</i> 4 EHRR 482 (1982).....	4
<i>Delalic and others</i> , Case No. IT-96-21.....	4
<i>Diversion of Water from the Meuse</i> (Neth. v. Belg.) 1937 PCIJ Ser. A/B No. 70.....	17
<i>Dix</i> 9 RIAA 119 (U.S. – Venez. 1902).....	6
<i>Donougho</i> 3 MOORE’S 3012 (Mex.-U.S. 1868).....	18
<i>East Timor</i> (Port. v. Austl.) 1995 ICJ 90.....	3,9
<i>Electronica Sicula</i> (U.S. v. Ital.) 1989, ICJ 15.....	20
<i>Erdemovic Sentencing Judgement</i> Trial Chamber I, Nov. 29 1996.....	15
<i>Ermerins</i> 4 RIAA 476 (Mex.-U.S. 1929).....	20
<i>Flegenheimer</i> 25 I.L.R. 91 (Ital. – U.S. 1958, I).....	1
<i>Furundzija</i> ICTR Case No. 09 321.....	5
<i>Godinez Cruz</i> 1989 Inter-ACHR, (Ser.C) No. 5.....	12
<i>Greece v United Kingdom</i> I.L.R. 25 (1958-I) 27.....	13
<i>Greek Case</i> 1969 Y.B.E.C.H.R., 186.....	4,5
<i>Hayden</i> 3 MOORE’S 2995.....	6
<i>HLR v France</i> (1998) 26 EHRR 29 97/23 7.....	6
<i>Home Missionary Society</i> 6 RIAA 42 (U.K. – U.S. 1920).....	5
<i>I’m Alone</i> 3 RIAA 1609 (Can.-U.S. 1935).....	7
<i>Iliolo</i> 6 RIAA 158 (U.K. – U.S. 1925).....	5
<i>Ireland v United Kingdom</i> 25 ECHR 66 (Ser.A)(1978).....	4,5

<i>Island of Palmas</i> (1928) 2 RIAA 829 (Perm. Ct. Arb, 1928).....	20
<i>Janes</i> RIAA 82 (Mex. – U.S. 1926).....	12
<i>Jelusic</i> No. IT-95-10 (Dec. 14, 1999).....	3
<i>Kennedy</i> 4 RIAA 194 (Mex.-U.S. 1927).....	20
<i>Klein</i> (1871), 80 US 13 Wall 128.....	7
<i>Langdon</i> 6 RIAA 325 (U.S. – Pan. 1933).....	13
<i>Lawrence Hornby’s Report</i> 397, (Mex.-U.S. Cl. Comm. 1855).....	17
<i>Lazo-Majano v I/S AND O/S</i> 813 F.2d 1432 (9 <sup>th</sup> Cir. 1987).....	3,5
<i>Legal Status of Eastern Greenland</i> PCIJ Ser. A/B No. 53.....	17
<i>Lewis</i> 3 MOORE’S 3019 (U.S.-Gr. Brit. 1871).....	18
<i>Mallen</i> 4 RIAA 173 (Mex. – U.S. 1927).....	18,20
<i>Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions</i> (Greece v. U.K.) 1925 PCIJ Ser. A, No. 5.....	17
<i>Maximilian Government</i> 3 MOORE 902 (U.S. – Mex. 1868).....	5
<i>McKenny</i> 3 MOORE 2881 (U.S. – Mex.).....	5
<i>Mead</i> 4 RIAA 653 (Mex.-U.S. 1930).....	20
<i>Medea and the Good Return</i> 3 Int. Arb. 2730, (Gren.-U.S. Cl. Comm. 1857).....	17
<i>Merge</i> 14 RIAA 236 (Ital. – U.S. 1955).....	1
<i>Mills</i> 3 Moore 3033 (Mex.-U.S. 1870).....	20
<i>Musema</i> ICTR Case No. 12,.....	5
<i>Neer</i> 4 RIAA 60 (Mex-US 1926).....	20
<i>Nicaragua</i> (Merits)(Nicar. v. U.S.) 1984, ICJ 1.....	1,11,17,20
<i>North Sea Continental Shelf</i> (Germ. v. Den.; Germ. v. Neth.)(1969) ICJ Rep. 3.....	11,14,20
<i>Nottebohm</i> (Liech. v Guat.)(Second Phase) 1955, ICJ 4.....	1

<i>Panevezys-Salduutiskis</i> (Est. – Lith.) 1939 PCIJ (ser A/B) No. 76.....	1
<i>Pelletier</i> 2 Int. Arb., 1749, 1750 (Haiti-U.S. Cl. Trib.).....	17
<i>Petrolane</i> 27 IRAN-U.S. CL. TRIB. REP.....	1
<i>Platform ‘Ärzte Für Das Leben’ v Austria</i> (1991) 13 EHRR 204 88/10.....	6
<i>Pugh</i> 3 RIAA 1441, 1448 (U.K. – Pan. 1993).....	13
<i>R v. Bartle and the Commissioner of Police Ex Parte Pinochet</i> 37 ILM 1302 (H.L. 1998-99).....	7
<i>Roper</i> 4 RIAA 145 (Mex. – U.S. 1927).....	13
<i>Sevey</i> 4 RIAA 474 (Mex.-U.S. 1929).....	20
<i>Smith</i> 4 RIAA 469 (Mex.-U.S. 1929).....	20
<i>Solis</i> 4 RIAA 358 (Mex. U.S. 1928).....	5,6
<i>Tehran Hostages</i> [1980] ICJ Rep 3.....	3,17
<i>Various Cases before the Mexican Claims Commission</i> 3 MOORE’S 2996.....	6
<i>Velasquez Rodriguez</i> 1988 Inter-ACHR (Ser.C) No.4.....	6,12
<i>Wipperman</i> 3 Moore’s 3039 (Caracas-U.S. 1868).....	20
<i>Yeager</i> 17 IRAN-U.S. CL. TRIB. REP 92, 111 (1987).....	18
<i>Zafiro</i> 6 RIAA 160 (U.K. – U.S. 1925).....	12
<i>Zuloaga and Miramon Governments</i> 3 MOORE 2873 (U.S. – Mex.).....	5

### **International Instruments and Conventions**

AFRICAN CHARTER ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES’ RIGHTS 1981.....	11
AMERICAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1978.....	11
ARAB CHARTER ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1997.....	11
CHARTER OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 1945.....	15
CHARTER OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST 1946.....	15



CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS 1945.....	14
CONVENTION FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF THE TRAFFIC IN PERSONS AND OF THE EXPLOITATION OF THE PROSTITUTION OF OTHERS 1949.....	15
CONVENTION ON THE PREVENTION AND PUNISHMENT OF THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE 1948.....	3
CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD 1990.....	17
CONVENTION TO SUPPRESS THE SLAVE TRADE AND SLAVERY 1926.....	10,11,15
COUNCIL OF EUROPE CRIMINAL LAW CONVENTION 1999.....	21
EUROPEAN CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS 1950.....	11
EXPLANATORY REPORT OF COUNCIL OF EUROPE CRIMINAL LAW CONVENTION 1999.....	21
INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 1966.....	11
ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT CONVENTION ON COMBATING BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTION 1997.....	21
PROTOCOL ADDITIONAL TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, AND RELATING TO THE PROTECTION OF VICTIMS OF NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS (PROTOCOL II) 1978.....	7
REGIONAL ANTI-CORRUPTION CONVENTION 1999.....	19,21
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 1998.....	3,15
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL OF RWANDA 1994.....	3,15
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL OF YUGOSLAVIA 1993.....	3,15
SUPPLEMENTARY CONVENTION ON THE ABOLITION OF SLAVERY, THE SLAVE TRADE AND INSTITUTIONS AND PRACTICES SIMILAR TO SLAVERY 1956.....	10,11,15
THE HAGUE CONVENTION ON THE CIVIL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION 1980.....	17
TRANSNATIONAL ORGANISED CRIME CONVENTION 2000.....	15
VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 1969.....	19

### **United Nations Documents**

G.A. RES 49/166, U.N. Doc. A/50/369 (1995).....	15
G.A. Res. 83, U.N. GAOR, 56 <sup>th</sup> Sess., Art.2, U.N. Doc.A/Res/56/83 (2002).....	3,6,8,9,13,18,22,23
LUSAKA CEASE FIRE AGREEMENT 10 July 1999, UN Doc. S/1999/815, Jul. 23 1999.....	7
Radhika Coomwaraswamy, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, its Causes and Consequences, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1999/68/Add.3 (Jan. 21 1999).....	6
STATEMENT OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, U.N. SCOR, 48 <sup>th</sup> Sess., 3238 <sup>th</sup> mtg. 120, U.N. Doc. S/INF/49 (1993).....	7
U.N. Doc. S/2000/59 (Jan. 31 2000).....	4
UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 880 (1993).....	7

### **Publicists: Books**

AA CACADO TRINDADE, THE APPLICATION OF THE RULE OF EXHAUSTION OF LOCAL REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1983).....	13
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, EAST TIMOR (1999).....	4
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, WOMEN IN THE FRONTLINE (1991).....	4
ANDRÉ DE HOOGH, OBLIGATIONS <i>ERGA OMNES</i> AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMES (1996).....	10
ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE (2000).....	19
ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW (2001).....	2,10,14,16,20
BIN CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS (1958).....	17
Bruno Simma, <i>Does the U.N. Charter Provide an Adequate Legal Basis for Individual or Collective Responses to Violations of Obligations Erga Omnes</i> , in FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ENFORCEMENT (Jost Delbruck ed., 1993).....	2,9,11
CHITTARANJAN AMERASINGHE, STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURIES TO ALIENS (1967).....	13,18,20
CHRISTINE CHINKIN, THIRD PARTIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1993).....	2
CHRISTINE GRAY, JUDICIAL REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1987).....	8,22

Claudia Annacker, <i>The Legal Regime of Erga Omnes Obligations in International Law</i> , 46 AUSTRIAN JOURNAL OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (1994).....	2
COMMENTARY ON THE PROTOCOL ADDITIONAL TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS of 12 August 1949, RELATING TO THE PROTECTION OF VICTIMS OF NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS (Protocol II)(Yves Sandoz et al. eds., 1987).....	7
DAVID HARRIS, LAW OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (1995).....	10
DINAH SHELTON, REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (1999).....	8,22
ELIZABETH ZOLLER, PEACETIME UNILATERAL REMEDIES (1984).....	17
Gerald Fitzmaurice, <i>The General Principles of International law</i> in 92 COLLECTED COURSES, ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1957).....	17
Giorgio Gaja, <i>Obligations Erga Omnes, International Crimes and Jus Cogens, in</i> INTERNATIONAL CRIMES OF STATE (MARIA SPINEDI et. al., 1989).....	9
Gitau Warigi, REGIONAL REPORTS- EAST AND EAST-CENTRAL AFRICA, TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL (2002).....	21
Hurst Hannum, <i>Human Rights, in</i> THE UNITED NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (Christopher Joyner, ed. 1997).....	11
IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (5 <sup>th</sup> ed. 1998).....	1,8,9,17,22
IAN BROWNLIE, SYSTEM OF THE LAW OF NATIONS, STATE RESPONSIBILITY (PART 1) (1983).....	18,20
INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY: IV GENEVA CONVENTION (Jean Pictet ed., 1958).....	5
J.H.W. VERZIJL, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (Part VI, 1973).....	8,22,23
JAMES CRAWFORD, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION'S ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY (2002).....	6,9,13,18,22,23
Jiminez Arechega, <i>International Responsibility, in</i> MANUAL OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (1968).....	19
John Murphy, <i>International crimes in</i> THE UNITED NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (Christopher Joyner ed. 1997).....	14
JUDITH GARDAM & MICHELLE JARVIS, WOMEN, ARMED CONFLICT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (2001).....	4

Keir Starmer, <i>Positive Obligations Under the Convention</i> in UNDERSTANDING HUMAN RIGHTS PRINCIPLES (Jeffrey Jowell and Jonathan Cooper eds., 2002).....	12
KELLY ASKIN & DOREAN KOEING, WOMEN AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS (1999).....	15
L. ALLNUTT, ET AL., REGIONAL REPORTS- COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES, TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL (2002).....	21
LAURI HANNIKAINEN, PEREMPTORY NORMS (JUS COGENS) IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1998).....	11
Leon Sheleff, <i>International White Collar Crime</i> in WHITE COLLAR & ECONOMIC CRIMES (Peter Wickman ed.1980).....	20
LOUIS HENKIN et al. CASES AND MATERIALS (3 <sup>rd</sup> ed., 1993).....	8,22
LOUIS HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLITICS AND VALUES (1995).....	11
M CLINARD & D ABBOTT, CRIME IN THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (1974).....	20
M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW (1999).....	4,5,14,15
MARTIN DIXON & ROBERT MCCORQUODALE, CASE & MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW (3 <sup>rd</sup> ed.2000).....	16
MERVYN JONES, FULL POWERS AND RATIFICATION: A STUDY OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF TREATY-MAKING PROCEDURE (1949).....	19
MICHAEL REISMAN FOLDED LIES (1979).....	20
NAOMI ROHT-ARRIAZA, IMMUNITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE (1995).....	12
OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds. 9 <sup>th</sup> ed. 1992).....	1,11,13,18,20
OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY & PRACTICE (1991).....	2,10,11,13,14
Oscar Schacter, <i>International Law in the Hostage Crisis</i> in AMERICAN HOSTAGES IN IRAN (WARREN CHRISTOPHER et al. 1985).....	17
R WRAITH & E SIMPKINS CORRUPTION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (1973).....	20

REBECCA WALLACE, INTERNATIONAL LAW (3 <sup>rd</sup> ed. 1997).....	18
RENÉ PROVOST, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS & HUMANITARIAN LAW (2002).....	2,9
Riccardo Pisillo-Mazzeesi, <i>The Due Diligence Rule and the Nature of the International Responsibility of States</i> , in STATE RESPONSIBILITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (René Provost ed., 2002).....	20
RICHARD LILICH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURIES TO ALIENS (1983).....	20
SAMUEL CRANDALL, TREATIES: THEIR MAKING AND ENFORCEMENT (1916).....	19
STEVEN RATNER & JASON ABRAMS, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ATROCITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2001).....	14,15
SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL (1975).....	4
THEODOR MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN NORMS AS CUSTOMARY LAW (1989).....	10,11
W PAATHI OFOSU-AMAAH, et al., COMBATING CORRUPTION (1999).....	20

### **Publicists: Journals**

Bruno Simma & Philip Alston, <i>The Sources of Human Rights Law</i> , 12 AUSTRALIAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 82 (1992).....	11
Carla Edelenbos, <i>Human Rights Violations</i> 7 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 5 (1994).....	8
Diane Orentlicher, <i>Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a Prior Regime</i> , 100 YALE L.J. 2537 (1991).....	23
George Curtis, <i>The Checkered Career of Parens Patriae</i> , 25 DEPAUL L. REV. (1976).....	17
Hugh Thirlway, <i>The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice 1960-1989</i> , 60 B.Y.I.L 1 (1989).....	2,9
Johan van der Vyver, <i>Prosecution and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide</i> , 23 FORDHAM INT'L. L. J. 286 (1999).....	4
Jonathan Charney, <i>Third State Remedies in International Law</i> , 10 MICH. J. INT'L. L. 57 (1989).....	2,8
Louis Henkin, <i>Human Rights &amp; State 'Sovereignty'</i> , 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 31, (1995).....	9

M. Cherif Bassiouni, <i>Enslavement as an International Crime</i> , N.Y.U J. INT'L L. & POL. 445 (1991).....	11
M. Cherif Bassiouni, <i>Universal jurisdiction for international crimes: historical perspectives and contemporary practice</i> , 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 82 (2001).....	16
Mark Ellies & Elizabeth Hutton, <i>Policy Implications of World War II Reparations and Restitution as Applied to the Former Yugoslavia</i> , 20 BERKLEY J. INT'L L. (2002).....	9
Michael Scharf, <i>The Amnesty Exception to the International Criminal Court</i> , 32 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 507 (1999).....	8
Payam Akhvan, <i>The Yugoslav Tribunal at Crossroads: The Dayton Peace Accords and Beyond</i> , 18 HUM. RTS. Q. 259 (1996).....	8
Prosper Weil, <i>Towards Relative Normativity in International Law</i> , 77 A.J.I.L. 413, (1983).....	2
R. Grote, <i>The United Nations and the Establishment of a new model of Governance for Central America</i> 2 MAX PLANCK YEARBOOK OF UNITED NATIONS LAW, 239 (1998).....	7
Rebecca Cook, <i>State Responsibility for Violation of Women's Human Rights</i> , 7 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 145 (1994).....	12
Robert Weiner and Fionnuala Ni Aolain, <i>Beyond the laws of War</i> 27 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 293 (1995).....	6
Sacharier, <i>State Responsibility for Multilateral Treaty Violations: Identifying the 'Injured State' and its Legal Status</i> 35 NETH. INT'L L. REV. 273 (1988).....	2,8
Sandhya Drew, <i>Human trafficking</i> 4 E.H.R.R. 450 (2002).....	10,11
Theodor Meron, <i>International Responsibility of States for Unauthorized Acts of their Officials</i> , 33 B.Y.B.I.L. 85 (1957).....	19
W. Michael Reisman, "Accountability for International Crime and serious violations of fundamental accountability for international crime and serious violations of fundamental human rights" 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 75 (1996).....	17
<b><u>National Legislation and Constitutions</u></b>	
ARGENTINA CONSTITUTION 1853.....	11
Argentina: LAW NO. 23.492, 1986.....	7
Belgium: The LAW OF 16 JUNE 1993.....	16

Belgium: The LAW OF 19 FEBRUARY 1999.....	16
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA CONSTITUTION 1995.....	11
Chile: DECRETO LEY No. 2.191, 1978.....	7
CONGO CONSTITUTION 1994.....	11
CYPRUS CONSTITUTION 1960.....	11
ETHIOPIA CONSTITUTION 1994.....	11
FIJI CONSTITUTION 1988.....	11
Fiji: IMMUNITY DECREE No. 18 OF 2000.....	7
Isreal: ISREALI-PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANISATION AGREEMENT ON THE GAZA STRIP AND THE JERICHO AREA 33 I.L.M. 622, 1994.....	7
Italy: ITALIAN CRIMINAL CODE 1930.....	16
JAPAN CONSTITUTION 1946.....	11
KENYA CONSTITUTION 1999.....	11
Malawi: CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 1995.....	21
NAMIBIA CONSTITUTION 1990.....	11
NEPAL CONSTITUTION 1991.....	11
PAKISTAN CONSTITUTION 1999.....	11
PARAGUAY CONSTITUTION 2000.....	11
Philippines: PROCLAMATIONS No. 347, PROCLAMATION No. 348, 1994.....	7
RWANDA CONSTITUTION 1991.....	11
SIERRA LEONE CONSTITUTION 1991.....	11
SINGAPORE CONSTITUTION 1963.....	11
SOUTH AFRICA CONSTITUTION 1997.....	11

South Africa: PROMOTION OF NATIONAL UNITY AND NATIONAL RECONCILIATION ACT, LAW No. 34 OF 1995.....	7
Spain: LAW ON JUDICIAL POWERS 1985.....	16
Sri Lanka: INDEMNITY LAW FOR SECURITY PERSONNEL, No. 20, 1982.....	7
SUDAN CONSTITUTION 1998.....	11
Tanzania: PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION ACT 1993.....	21
U.S. 13 <sup>th</sup> AMENDMENT TO CONSTITUTION 1865.....	11
UK: PUBLIC BODIES CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 1889.....	21
UNITED KINGDOM LEGAL SYSTEM 1992.....	11
ZAMBIA CONSTITUTION 1991.....	11
 <b><u>Miscellaneous</u></b>	
DECLARATION AND LEGAL PRINCIPLES RELATING TO THE PROTECTION AND WELFARE OF CHILDREN, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO FOSTER PLACEMENT AND ADOPTION NATIONALLY AND INTERNATIONALLY 1986.....	17
DECLARATION ON THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC AND POPULAR REPUBLIC OF ALGERIA CONCERNING THE SETTLEMENT OF CLAIMS BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN (CLAIMS SETTLEMENT DECLARATION) 1981.....	1
J.H. Ntabgoba <i>New People</i> (Kenya) April 1 2001.....	21
The Federalist no. 74 (1788), 390 F Supp 1372.....	7
US DELEGATION DRAFT (REV.) TO THE ICC PREP COM (August 1997).....	7
US Dept. of State, <i>Country Reports on Human Rights Practices</i> 2000, available at <a href="http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2000/">http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2000/</a> .....	21



## **STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION**

The Republic of Annolay and the Republic of Reston have submitted the present dispute by Special Agreement to the International Court of Justice pursuant to Articles 36(1) and 40(1) of the Statute of the Court for final resolution. There is no dispute as to the court's jurisdiction in this matter.

## **STATEMENT OF FACTS**

Following three years of civil war, the Kingdom of Dysfuncntia was partitioned to create the Republics of Reston and Cascadia in September 1999. The Republic of Annolay, which borders Reston and Cascadia, assisted in the peace talks at the conclusion of the war. Annolay is a developed country in contrast to Reston, whose developing economy was devastated by the civil war.

In April 1997, War-Time Relief International claimed that Restonian militiamen were raping ethnic Cascadian women. However, Colonel Georg Raskolnikov, the leader of the Restonian militia, stated that he was powerless to stop the rapes.

Raskolnikov was announced as Reston's first democratically elected President in November 1999. His first presidential task was to foster reconciliation within the country by granting an amnesty to all persons in Reston who were accused of crimes during the civil war. Further, he established crisis centres for war victims. Annolay has reopened the wounds of the war by seeking reparations for Cascadian women raped during the war.

Due to Cascadia's conservative culture, rape victims were ostracised by their communities. The Schmandefare Company ('Company'), an operator of numerous brothels, coerced thousands of these women to Annolay. The Company's Chief Executive Officer, Fred Schmandefare, promised the women positions as nannies or domestic servants but despite all promises, the women were forced to work as prostitutes. The Company charged each woman an administrative fee of US\$10 000. To pay this amount the women took out compounding loans from the Company, the effect of which was to double the amount owed. Ongoing costs for shelter, clothing, food and medical attention were added to the compounding debt. Although illegal, prostitution and solicitation are rarely prosecuted in Annolay.

The Institute for Labour Studies and Advancement ('ILSA') published an article about Cascadian women forced to work in the Company's brothels in May 2001. ILSA found that the women were mentally and physically abused. The report claimed that Annolaysian police and at least three government departments ignored written appeals for help. The case of 'Heidi F' was reported as indicative of the treatment women experienced in the Company's brothels. 'Heidi F' was subjected to wretched conditions and severe restraints on her liberty. She fled from the brothel but Annolaysian police promptly returned her.

President Contrary denied Annolay's responsibility for the Company's abuse of the women. Following this, Reston expressed its intention to prosecute Schmandefare, applying the principle of universal jurisdiction. Reston seeks to prosecute Schmandefare for the crime against humanity of illegal trafficking for the purpose of sexual slavery.

In December 1999, the Annolaysian Regional Adoption Society ('ARAS'), through advertisements, called for the adoption of children orphaned in the civil war. ARAS charged a fee for its assistance to Annolaysian nationals seeking to adopt Restonian orphans. Reston's adoption laws obligated all prospective adoptive parents to attend mandatory fitness interviews. Successful applicants received a 'Certificate of Authorization for Foreign Adoption' ('certificate of fitness'), which was required for presentation at the border.

In January 2001, the *International Times-Picayune* reported that Reston's border officials were requesting fees from adopting parents, which was outside their authority. Although many Annolaysian adopting parents did not hold certificates of fitness for adoption, Annolaysian border officials seldom questioned them and in all cases allowed them to re-enter Annolay with a child. Upon the parents' return to Annolay, Annolaysian authorities swiftly concluded the adoption process. Consequently, a number of adopting parents admitted that they did not attend

fitness interviews in light of Annolay's lax adoption administration process. Reston addressed the issue by permanently reassigning implicated border officials in March 2001.

Both Reston and Annolay are UN members and parties to Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, and both voted in favour of UN General Assembly Resolution 56/83 regarding the International Law Commission's Articles on State Responsibility. Annolay is a party to, and Reston is a signatory to, the Regional Anti-Corruption Convention.

After several failed attempts at mediation facilitated by the UN Secretary General's office, Annolay and Reston agreed to bring this dispute before the International Court of Justice for resolution.

## **QUESTION PRESENTED**

Reston asks the court:

1. whether Annolay has standing to bring a claim on behalf of the ethnic Cascadian women resident in Annolay;
2. whether Reston acted lawfully regarding the treatment of ethnic Cascadian women during the civil war and must pay damages to Annolay;
3. whether Reston has standing to bring an action regarding the treatment of ethnic Cascadian women;
4. whether Annolay breached international law regarding the treatment of ethnic Cascadian women working in Annolaysian brothels;
5. whether Reston may exercise universal jurisdiction to prosecute Mr. Schmandefare;
6. whether Annolay's claim regarding border corruption is admissible;
7. whether Reston acted lawfully regarding the conduct of its border officials; and
8. whether Reston is required to pay restitution to Annolay in the amount of the bribes.

## SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS

I. Reston is not responsible for the wartime rape of ethnic Cascadian women, nor is it liable to pay damages to Annolay on their behalf. Annolay does not have standing to bring a claim on behalf of wartime rape victims. Annolay cannot exercise diplomatic protection as the Cascadian women are not nationals of Annolay. Standing cannot be asserted on the basis of obligations *erga omnes* because Annolay is not representing the international community. Alternatively, Reston did not breach any such obligations. The wartime rapes did not constitute genocide or torture so as to give rise to any obligation on Reston's part. Even if they did, the rapes are not attributable to Reston, and the Restonian militia leaders were unable to stop them. Reston's amnesty also justifies any breach of an obligation to prosecute Restonian militiamen. In any event, Reston is not liable to pay damages to Annolay because it is inappropriate for a state to request them on behalf of a limited group of victims for a breach of an obligation *erga omnes*.

II. Annolay acted unlawfully regarding the treatment of Cascadian women in its territory. Reston has standing to bring this claim on behalf of the international community because slavery is an obligation *erga omnes*. The ethnic Cascadian women who worked in brothels in Annolay were held in slavery because the Schmandefare Company exercised rights of ownership over them. Annolay breached its customary obligation to respect and ensure freedom from slavery by failing to prevent and punish acts of slavery. The Cascadian women are not under any obligation to exhaust local remedies in Annolay.

III. Reston may exercise universal jurisdiction to prosecute Fred Schmandefare for the crime against humanity of illegal trafficking for the purpose of sexual slavery. Universal jurisdiction may be exercised over crimes against humanity, and trafficking for the purpose of sexual slavery

is characterised as such an offence. The trial of Schmandefare *in absentia* is concordant with the content and purpose of the universality principle.

IV Reston is not responsible for corruption at its borders, nor liable to repay bribes in the form of restitution. Annolay's failure to prevent the illegal removal of Restonian children invokes the doctrine of 'unclean hands', which renders a claim for restitution inadmissible. In any event, Reston did not breach international law with respect to the bribes. The bribery is not attributable to Reston as the border officials were acting in their private capacity and outside their authority. Reston upheld the object and purpose of the Regional Anti-Corruption Convention and exercised due diligence to protect Annolaysian nationals by permanently reassigning implicated border officials. Furthermore, there is no customary obligation to prevent bribery of public officials exists, nor did Reston breach such an obligation. Reston also acted in the best interests of Restonian children, and thus did not violate any obligations concerning the children's rights. Even if Reston did breach international law, it does not owe Annolay reparations. Restitution would impose a disproportionate burden on Reston and Annolay cannot claim compensation because this remedy was not requested.





## PLEADINGS

### **I. RESTON IS NOT INTERNATIONALLY LIABLE FOR THE TREATMENT OF CASCADIAN WOMEN DURING THE CIVIL WAR**

This dispute arises from a civil war that existed in the former sovereign territory of Dysfuncitia [*Compromis* ¶1]. Annolay had no involvement in the war [*Compromis* ¶6] and no right to intervene in Dysfuncitia's internal affairs.<sup>1</sup> Now, as then, international legal norms prevent Annolay from involving itself in matters existing between Restonians and Cascadians.

#### **A. ANNOLAY HAS NO STANDING TO BRING THIS ACTION**

The action regarding rapes during the civil war is inadmissible, as Annolay cannot adequately invoke a basis for standing. Diplomatic protection allows a state to protect its injured nationals and requires the victim to have continuously held the nationality of the asserting state from the time of the injury until the presentation of the claim.<sup>2</sup> The ethnic Cascadian complainants only recently acquired permanent residency in Annolay [*Compromis* ¶25], which is not a genuine and effective link of nationality for the purposes of diplomatic protection.<sup>3</sup> Even if permanent residency is a sufficient link of nationality, the link was established after the injury occurred [*Compare Compromis* ¶3 & ¶25], and therefore was not continuous. Consequently, Annolay has no standing on the basis of diplomatic protection.

---

<sup>1</sup>*Nicaragua* (Merits)(Nicar. v. U.S.) 1984, ICJ 1, ¶¶202 & 203 (Nov. 26).

<sup>2</sup>*See: Panevezys-Salduotiskis* (Est. – Lith.) 1939 PCIJ (ser A/B) No. 76: (Dis. Op. Judge Guggenheim); *Petrolane* 27 IRAN-U.S. CL.TRIB.REP. 64 (1991); IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 403 (5<sup>th</sup> ed. 1998); OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW §150 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds. 9<sup>th</sup> ed. 1992)[‘OPPENHEIM’S’]; DECLARATION ON THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC AND POPULAR REPUBLIC OF ALGERIA CONCERNING THE SETTLEMENT OF CLAIMS BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN (CLAIMS SETTLEMENT DECLARATION), Jan. 19, 1981, Art.VII(2).

<sup>3</sup>*See Nottebohm* (Liech. v Guat.)(Second Phase) 1955, ICJ 4, 22 (Apr. 6); *Flegenheimer* 25 I.L.R. 91 (Ital. – U.S. 1958, I); *Merge* 14 RIAA 236, 246 (Ital. – U.S. 1955).

Also, Annolay may not derive standing from obligations *erga omnes* ('towards all') because it does not act on behalf of the international community. Obligations *erga omnes* are owed to the entire international community,<sup>4</sup> so their breach injures that community.<sup>5</sup> The international community is unable to bring a claim of its own as it has no legal personality.<sup>6</sup> Therefore, standing must be conferred on those member states prepared to act on its behalf.<sup>7</sup> Annolay's claim of reparations for the narrow class of victims now resident within its territory is an inappropriate claim as it represents Annolay's own interests rather than those of the international community.<sup>8</sup>

In any event, standing is limited to the established obligations *erga omnes*: the outlawing of acts of aggression and genocide, protection from slavery and racial discrimination,<sup>9</sup> and the

---

<sup>4</sup>*Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Company, Limited* (Second Phase) (Belg. v. Spain) 1970 ICJ 3 (Feb. 5) ¶33 ('*Barcelona Traction*').

<sup>5</sup>Bruno Simma, *Does the U.N. Charter Provide an Adequate Legal Basis for Individual or Collective Responses to Violations of Obligations Erga Omnes*, in *FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ENFORCEMENT* 136 (Jost Delbruck ed., 1993); Hugh Thirlway, *The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice 1960-1989*, 60 B.Y.B.L 1, 93 (1989).

<sup>6</sup>CHRISTINE CHINKIN, *THIRD PARTIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW* 286 (1993); Claudia Annacker, *The Legal Regime of Erga Omnes Obligations in International Law*, 46 AUSTRIAN JOURNAL OF PUBLIC AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 131, 139 (1994); Prosper Weil, *Towards Relative Normativity in International Law*, 77 A.J.I.L. 413, 432 (1983).

<sup>7</sup>RENÉ PROVOST, *INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS & HUMANITARIAN LAW* 292 (2002); CHRISTINE CHINKIN, *supra* n.6, 286; Claudia Annacker, *supra* n.6, 156; ANTONIO CASSESE, *INTERNATIONAL LAW* 16 (2001). *Also see* Bruno Simma, *supra* n.5, 136; OSCAR SCHACHTER, *INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY & PRACTICE* 345 (1991).

<sup>8</sup>*See* ANTONIO CASSESE, *supra* n.7, 201; Sacharier, *State Responsibility for Multilateral Treaty Violations: Identifying the 'Injured State' and its Legal Status* 35 NETH. INT'L. L. REV. 273, 284 (1988). *See* Jonathan Charney, *Third State Remedies in International Law*, 10 MICH. J. INT'L. L. 57, 98 (1989).

<sup>9</sup>*Barcelona Traction* *supra* n. 4, ¶34.

right to self-determination.<sup>10</sup> Annolay has no standing to assert a breach of any other obligation.

**B. ALTERNATIVELY, RESTON ACTED CONSISTENTLY WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW REGARDING THE TREATMENT OF CASCADIAN WOMEN**

A state only breaches international law if conduct that is attributable to it breaches an international obligation.<sup>11</sup> The occurrence of the rapes prior to the establishment of Reston precludes Reston from being internationally responsible for the wartime rapes, and other rules of international law demonstrate that Reston did not breach any of the limited obligations *erga omnes*.

**1. No obligations *erga omnes* may be invoked on the facts**

*a. The wartime rapes did not constitute genocide*

The rapes perpetrated by the Restonian militiamen did not constitute genocide. Genocide requires an intention to destroy an ethnic group in whole or in part.<sup>12</sup> Such an intention must be formed prior to the commission of the offence.<sup>13</sup> Rape is primarily a sexually or privately motivated offence.<sup>14</sup> There is no evidence that the wartime rapes were intended to destroy the Cascadian group or that acts of rape were pre-meditated. Without clear evidence of such intent

---

<sup>10</sup>*East Timor* (Port. v. Austl.) 1995 ICJ 90 (Jun. 30) ¶29 [*‘East Timor’*].

<sup>11</sup>*Tehran Hostages case* [1980] ICJ Rep 3, ¶56; G.A. Res. 83, U.N. GAOR, 56<sup>th</sup> Sess., Art.2, U.N. Doc.A/Res/56/83 (2002)[*‘ILC State Responsibility’*].

<sup>12</sup>CONVENTION ON THE PREVENTION AND PUNISHMENT OF THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE 1948, Art.2; STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL OF YUGOSLAVIA 1993, Art.4(2)[*‘ICTY STATUTE’*]; STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL OF RWANDA 1994, Art.2(2) [*‘ICTR STATUTE’*]; STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 1998, Art.6 [*‘ROME STATUTE’*]; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 702 (American Law Institute ed., 1987)[*‘RESTATEMENT’*].

<sup>13</sup>*Clément Kayishema & Obed Ruzindana*, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T ¶91 (May 21 1999)[*‘Kayishema’*].

<sup>14</sup>*See Lazo-Majano v INS*, 813 F.2d 1432, 1434 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1987)[*‘Lazo-Majano’*]; *Campos-Guardado v INS*, 484 U.S. 826 (1987)[*‘Campos-Guardado’*].

rape should not be characterised as genocide.<sup>15</sup> Additionally, genocide generally requires the involvement of the state.<sup>16</sup> The absence of incitement or condonation by the Restonian leadership therefore precludes the characterisation of the rapes as genocide.<sup>17</sup> In any event, rape must be accompanied by aggravating acts, such as murder, to constitute genocide.<sup>18</sup> There is no evidence that Cascadian women suffered any other attacks or restraints on their liberty and consequently genocide has not occurred.

*b. No other obligation erga omnes applies*

No other obligation *erga omnes* recognised by this court [see §I:A] is applicable to the wartime rapes. Even if this court should expand on the limited number of obligations *erga omnes*, it is likely that it would only do so to include obligations regarding torture.

Torture only covers the intentional infliction of severe physical or psychological pain or suffering for an interrogative purpose with the acquiescence of a public official.<sup>19</sup> The requisite

---

<sup>15</sup>Cf Radhika Coomwaraswamy, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, its Causes and Consequences, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1999/68/Add.3 (Jan. 21 1999); U.N. Doc. S/2000/59 (Jan. 31 2000); JUDITH GARDAM & MICHELLE JARVIS, WOMEN, ARMED CONFLICT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 30 (2001); SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL 31-113 (1975); AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, EAST TIMOR 28-29 (1999); AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, WOMEN IN THE FRONTLINE 44 (1991).

<sup>16</sup>*Kayishema supra* n.13 ¶ 94.

<sup>17</sup>Cf *Kayishema supra* n.13; *Goran Jelisic* No. IT-95-10 (Dec. 14, 1999); *Prosecutor v Akayesu* Case No ICTR-96-4 (Sept. 2, 1998)[‘*Akayesu*’].

<sup>18</sup>Cf *Kayishema supra* n.13 *Akayesu supra* n.17 96-4; Johan van der Vyver, *Prosecution and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide*, 23 FORDHAM INT’L. L. J. 286, 311 (1999).

<sup>19</sup>*Ireland v United Kingdom* 25 ECHR 66 (Ser.A)(1978)[‘*Ireland*’]; *Greek Case*, 1969 Y.B.E.C.H.R., 186; M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 351 (1999).

pain and suffering must amount to more than a mere assault on personal integrity<sup>20</sup> and cause prolonged suffering of extreme intensity.<sup>21</sup> Rape cannot constitute torture without such aggravating factors.<sup>22</sup> There is no evidence that the rapes were prolonged nor is there evidence that the individual acts of rape were accompanied by additional injury. The rapes of Cascadian women were also not inflicted for an interrogative purpose.<sup>23</sup> Rape is primarily sexually or privately motivated<sup>24</sup> and there is no evidence that Restonian militiamen raped Cascadian women to gain information. In any case, there is neither condonation of the rapes nor clear acquiescence [*Compromis* ¶3] by public officials and as such torture has not occurred.<sup>25</sup>

**2. In any event, Reston did not breach any obligation *erga omnes***

*a. Reston did not breach any obligation prohibiting the wartime rapes*

At customary international law there is a general presumption of non-responsibility for the conduct of an insurrectional movement.<sup>26</sup> However, such conduct may be attributable to the

---

<sup>20</sup>INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY: IV GENEVA CONVENTION 598 (Jean Pictet ed., 1958).

<sup>21</sup>*See Ireland, supra* n.19, 66.

<sup>22</sup>*Cf Cyprus v Turkey* 4 EHRR 482 (1982); *Campos-Guardado, supra* n.14; *Ireland, supra* n.19, 67.

<sup>23</sup>*Greek case, supra* n.19, 186; *Prosecuter v Delalic and others*, Case No. IT-96-21, ¶38 (Sep. Dis. Ops. Judge Hunt, Bennouna)M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, *supra* n.19, 351.

<sup>24</sup>*See Lazo-Majano, supra* n.14, 1434; *Campos-Guardado, supra.* n.14, 826.

<sup>25</sup>*See Musema* ICTR Case No. 12, 645; *Furundzija* ICTR Case No. 09 321; M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, *supra* n.19, 351.

<sup>26</sup>*Zuloaga and Miramon Governments*, 3 MOORE 2873 (U.S. – Mex.); *McKenny*, 3 MOORE 2881 (U.S. – Mex.); *Confederate States*, 3 MOORE 2886 (U.S. – Mex. 1868); *Confederate Debt*, 3 MOORE 2900 (U.S. – U.K. 1871); *Maximilian Government*, 3 MOORE 902 (U.S. – Mex. 1868); *Iliolo*, 6 RIAA 158 (U.K. – U.S. 1925); *Solis*, 4 RIAA 358 (Mex. U.S. 1928); *Home Missionary Society*, 6 RIAA 42 (U.K. – U.S. 1920).

state in the event that the movement is successful.<sup>27</sup> Although the conduct of the Restonian militia is attributable to Reston pursuant to this rule, the rapes perpetrated by individual militiamen are not. The conduct of individuals acting in their private capacity is not attributable to Reston.<sup>28</sup> Individual militiamen who act in the absence of command do so in their private capacity.<sup>29</sup> Doubt surrounds the extent to which the rapes were condoned by militia commanders [*Compromis* ¶3] and the existence of a command structure is questionable [*Compromis* ¶4]. The rapes were therefore committed by individual militiamen in the absence of either control<sup>30</sup> or command<sup>31</sup> and are not attributable to Reston.

*b. Reston did not breach any obligation requiring it to prevent the wartime rapes*

Should this court find Reston subject to customary obligations requiring it to prevent wartime rapes, Reston discharged these obligations. Any obligation to prevent rape is only breached if a state fails to take measures that are reasonably expected in the circumstances.<sup>32</sup> The rapes were committed in the context of ethnic rivalry in existence for approximately 300 years [*Compromis* ¶2]. When Colonel Raskolnikov was informed of the rapes he declared that he was

---

<sup>27</sup>*ILC State Responsibility, supra* n.11 Art.10(2).

<sup>28</sup>*Solis, supra* n.26, 362; JAMES CRAWFORD, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION'S ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY 117 (2002).

<sup>29</sup>*See Various Cases before the Mexican Claims Commission, 3 MOORE'S 2996; Hayden, 3 MOORE'S 2995.*

<sup>30</sup>*Dix, 9 RIAA 119, 120 (U.S. – Venez. 1902).*

<sup>31</sup>*See Various Cases before the Mexican Claims Commission, supra* n.29, 2996; *Hayden, supra* n.29, 2995.

<sup>32</sup>*Cf. Platform 'Ärzte Für Das Leben' v Austria* (1991) 13 EHRR 204 88/10 ¶ 32; Robert Weiner and Fionnuala Ni Aolain, *Beyond the laws of War* 27 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 293, 345 (1995); *See also HLR v France* (1998) 26 EHRR 29 97/23 745, ¶ 40; *Velasquez Rodriguez, 1988 Inter-ACHR (Ser.C) No.4 ¶174.*

powerless to stop them [*Compromis* ¶4]. Thus, in the context of the Dysfunctionian civil war, measures to prevent the rapes could not reasonably be expected from the Restonian militia leaders.

*c. Reston did not breach any obligation requiring it to prosecute the wartime rapes*

Reston did not breach any obligation to prosecute those who committed rape because of the general amnesty declared by President Raskolnikov. Post-conflict states may avoid customary obligations to prosecute individuals by granting amnesties in the interests of reconciliation, stability and democracy, and to prevent the re-emergence of conflict.<sup>33</sup> National legislation,<sup>34</sup> the UN Security Council,<sup>35</sup> an international agreement,<sup>36</sup> judicial decisions<sup>37</sup> and

---

<sup>33</sup>See *R v. Bartle and the Commissioner of Police Ex Parte Pinochet*, 37 ILM 1302, 1317, 1322 (H.L. 1998-99) (Nov. 25, 1998); *Azanian Peoples Org.*, (4) SALR 690; *Klein* (1871), 80 US 13 Wall 128; COMMENTARY ON THE PROTOCOL ADDITIONAL TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, RELATING TO THE PROTECTION OF VICTIMS OF NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS (Protocol II) 4618 (Yves Sandoz et al. eds., 1987); W. Michael Reisman, "Accountability for International Crime and serious violations of fundamental accountability for international crime and serious violations of fundamental human rights" 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 75, 79 (1996); *The Federalist* no. 74 (1788), 390 F Supp 1372; US DELEGATION DRAFT (REV.) TO THE ICC PREP COM (August 1997).

<sup>34</sup>Sri Lanka: INDEMNITY LAW FOR SECURITY PERSONNEL, No. 20, 1982; Argentina: LAW NO. 23.492, 1986; Chile: DECRETO LEY NO. 2.191, 1978; Philippines: PROCLAMATIONS NO. 347, PROCLAMATION NO. 348, 1994; Israel: ISREALI-PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANISATION AGREEMENT ON THE GAZA STRIP AND THE JERICHO AREA 33 I.L.M. 622, 635-636, 1994; Fiji: IMMUNITY DECREE NO. 18 OF 2000; South Africa: PROMOTION OF NATIONAL UNITY AND NATIONAL RECONCILIATION ACT, LAW NO. 34 OF 1995.

<sup>35</sup>Haiti: STATEMENT OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, U.N. SCOR, 48<sup>th</sup> Sess., 3238<sup>th</sup> mtg. 120, U.N. Doc. S/INF/49 (1993); Cambodia: UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 880 (1993); Guatemala: See R. Grote, *The United Nations and the Establishment of a new model of Governance for Central America* 2 MAX PLANCK YEARBOOK OF UNITED NATIONS LAW 239 (1998); Congo: LUSAKA CEASE FIRE AGREEMENT Jul. 10 1999, UN Doc. S/1999/815, Jul. 23 1999.

<sup>36</sup>PROTOCOL ADDITIONAL TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, AND RELATING TO THE PROTECTION OF VICTIMS OF NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS (PROTOCOL II), 1978 Art.6(5).

the opinions of publicists<sup>38</sup> evidence the customary status of this power. President Raskolnikov's amnesty to promote national healing [*Compromis* ¶22] is consistent with these established justifications.

**C. IN ANY EVENT, RESTON IS NOT REQUIRED TO MAKE REPARATIONS TO ANNOLAY**

The consequence of an internationally wrongful act is that the delinquent state must make reparations to any other state that suffers injury<sup>39</sup> for which the wrongful act is the proximate cause.<sup>40</sup> Where Reston is not responsible for the rapes it does not owe reparations.

In any event, the remedies available to an injured state are limited if standing is conferred on the basis of obligations *erga omnes*.<sup>41</sup> Actions concerning obligations *erga omnes* are brought on behalf of the international community.<sup>42</sup> It is inappropriate for a state to seek individual reparations for itself or a limited class of individuals when it is bringing an action on behalf of the international community.<sup>43</sup> Therefore, Annolay may not seek individual reparations for the

---

<sup>37</sup>*Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago and Lennox Phillip* No. 2 (1995), I AC 396; *Border Guards Prosecution* 100 I.L.R. 366.

<sup>38</sup>Payam Akhvan, *The Yugoslav Tribunal at Crossroads: The Dayton Peace Accords and Beyond*, 18 HUM. RTS. Q. 259, 271 (1996); Carla Edelenbos, *Human Rights Violations* 7 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 5, 13 (1994); Michael Scharf, *The Amnesty Exception to the International Criminal Court*, 32 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 507, 521-523 (1999).

<sup>39</sup>*Chorzów Factory* (Germ. v. Pol.)(Merits) 1927 PCIJ, (ser. A), No. 9, 20 ('Chorzów'); *ILC State Responsibility*, *supra* n.11, Art.31; CHRISTINE GRAY, *JUDICIAL REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW* 79 (1987); IAN BROWNLIE, *supra* n.2, 460.

<sup>40</sup>DINAH SHELTON, *REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW* 10 (1999); J.H.W. VERZIJL, *INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE* 735 (Part VI, 1973); LOUIS HENKIN et al. *CASES AND MATERIALS*, 758 (3<sup>rd</sup> ed., 1993).

<sup>41</sup>Jonathan Charney, *supra* n.8, 98.

<sup>42</sup>*Barcelona Traction*, *supra* n.4, ¶33.

<sup>43</sup>Sacharier, *supra* n.8, 283.



Cascadian women within its territory. Satisfaction, which may consist of an expression of regret or a formal apology,<sup>44</sup> is the only appropriate remedy because it may be directed to the international community.<sup>45</sup>

## **II. ANNOLAY BREACHED INTERNATIONAL LAW WITH RESPECT TO THE TREATMENT OF CASCADIAN WOMEN IN ANNOLAY**

Reston brings this claim in relation to the abhorrent treatment of Cascadian women in Annolay. Although Annolay seeks to protect these women in one respect by requesting that this court award them damages for wartime injury, Annolay has not afforded the women the protection they deserve within its territory.

### **A. RESTON HAS STANDING TO BRING THIS ACTION**

A member state of the international community has standing to assert a breach of an obligation *erga omnes*<sup>46</sup> regardless of the nationality of the victim.<sup>47</sup> The sole condition is that the state acts on behalf of the international community [see §I:A]. Protection from slavery is an obligation *erga omnes* [see §I:A], and Reston is seeking a declaration from this court rather than any other form of reparation. Reston therefore has standing to assert a breach of the obligation to

---

<sup>44</sup>See *ILC State Responsibility*, *supra* n.11, Art.37; See Mark Ellies & Elizabeth Hutton, *Policy Implications of World War II Reparations and Restitution as Applied to the Former Yugoslavia*, 20 BERKLEY J. INT'L L. 342 (2002).

<sup>45</sup>JAMES CRAWFORD, *supra* n.28, 232; IAN BROWNLIE, *supra* n.2, 463.

<sup>46</sup>*East Timor* (Port. v. Austl.), 1995 ICJ 90 (Jun. 30), 172 & 221 (Dis. Op. of Judge Weeramantry), 266 (Dis. Op. of Judge *ad hoc* Szubiszewski); *ILC State Responsibility*, *supra* n.11, Art.48; RENÉ PROVOST, *supra* n.7, 125; Giorgio Gaja, *Obligations Erga Omnes, International Crimes and Jus Cogens*, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMES OF STATE 154 (MARIA SPINEDI et. al., 1989); Hugh Thirlway, *supra* n.5, 93; RESTATEMENT, *supra* n.12, §702; Louis Henkin, *Human Rights & State 'Sovereignty'*, 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 31, 42 (1995).

<sup>47</sup>ANTONIO CASSESE, *supra* n.7, 185 & 201; THEODOR MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN NORMS AS CUSTOMARY LAW 191 & 194-95 (1989); ANDRÉ DE HOOGH, OBLIGATIONS *ERGA OMNES* AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 68 (1996); OSCAR SCHACHTER, *supra* n.7, 208; RESTATEMENT *supra* n.12, §702, Comment (b).

respect and ensure freedom from slavery.

**B. ANNOLAY BREACHED ITS OBLIGATION TO RESPECT AND ENSURE FREEDOM FROM SLAVERY**

The Schmandefare Company's ['Company'] treatment of ethnic Cascadian women constituted slavery. Slavery is the situation in which entities exercise rights of ownership over individuals,<sup>48</sup> characterised by the victims' lack of true consent and lack of control over their own labour.<sup>49</sup> The Company deceived the Cascadian women by promising them employment as nannies or domestic servants, yet forced them to work in its brothels [*Compromis* ¶24]. Upon arrival in Annolay, the Company controlled the Cascadian women's work schedule, labour conditions, standard of living and financial position [*Compromis* ¶¶24 & 29]. The women also suffered mental and physical abuse and restraints on their liberty. The Cascadian women were also unable to escape the Company's control due to the compounding debt on their loans [*Compromis* ¶24]. Therefore, the Cascadian women were enslaved due to their lack of consent to work in brothels and the control the Company exercised over them.

As ethnic Cascadian women were enslaved in Annolay, Annolay breached customary international law. Customary international law is formed by general and consistent practice and *opinio juris*.<sup>50</sup> International<sup>51</sup> and regional instruments,<sup>52</sup> national constitutions<sup>53</sup> and the work of

---

<sup>48</sup>CONVENTION TO SUPPRESS THE SLAVE TRADE AND SLAVERY 1926 ['SLAVERY CONVENTION'], Art.1; SUPPLEMENTARY CONVENTION ON THE ABOLITION OF SLAVERY, THE SLAVE TRADE AND INSTITUTIONS AND PRACTICES SIMILAR TO SLAVERY 1956 ['SUPPLEMENTARY SLAVERY CONVENTION'], Art.7(a); DAVID HARRIS, LAW OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 91 (1995).

<sup>49</sup>Sandhya Drew, *Human trafficking* 4 E.H.R.R. 450, 487 (2002).

<sup>50</sup>*North Sea Continental Shelf* (Germ. v Den.; Germ. v Neth.)(1969) ICJ Rep. 3, ¶77; *Nicaragua supra* n.1, ¶186.

publicists,<sup>54</sup> demonstrate that every state must respect and ensure freedom from slavery under customary international law. Freedom from slavery is also a *jus cogens* norm.<sup>55</sup> The customary obligation to respect and ensure freedom from slavery is not negated by occasional non-observance of the slavery prohibition.<sup>56</sup>

Annolay breached its customary obligation to respect and ensure freedom from slavery. This obligation requires a state to prevent,<sup>57</sup> investigate<sup>58</sup> and prosecute<sup>59</sup> acts of slavery. A state

---

<sup>51</sup>See INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 1966, Art.8 ['ICCPR']; SLAVERY CONVENTION, *supra* n.48, Art.2; SUPPLEMENTARY SLAVERY CONVENTION, *supra* n.48, Art.1.

<sup>52</sup>EUROPEAN CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS 1950 Art.4; See ARAB CHARTER ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1997; AMERICAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1978 Art.6; AFRICAN CHARTER ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES' RIGHTS 1981 Art.5.

<sup>53</sup>CONSTITUTIONS: ETHIOPIA 1994, Art.18; ARGENTINA 1853, §15; BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 1995, Art.2; CONGO 1994, Art.31; CYPRUS 1960, Art.10; FIJI 1988, Art.24; JAPAN 1946, Preamble; KENYA 1999, Art.73; NAMIBIA 1990, Art.9; NEPAL 1991, Art.20; PAKISTAN 1999, Art.11; PARAGUAY 2000, Art.10; SIERRA LEONE 1991, Art.19; SOUTH AFRICA 1997, §13; ZAMBIA 1991, Art.14; SUDAN 1998, Art.20; RWANDA 1991, Art.17; SINGAPORE 1963, Art.15; UNITED KINGDOM LEGAL SYSTEM 1992 §6; ZAMBIA 1991, Art.14; U.S. 13<sup>th</sup> AMENDMENT TO CONSTITUTION 1865.

<sup>54</sup>OPPENHEIM'S *supra* n.2, 981; LOUIS HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLITICS AND VALUES 189 (1995); RESTATEMENT *supra* n.12, §702; THEODOR MERON, *supra* n.47, 10; Hurst Hannum, *Human Rights, in* THE UNITED NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, 151 (Christopher Joyner, ed. 1997).

<sup>55</sup>LOUIS HENKIN, *supra* n.54, 39; LAURI HANNIKAINEN, PEREMPTORY NORMS (JUS COGENS) IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 446 (1998); see OSCAR SCHACHTER, *supra* n.7, 343; M. Cherif Bassiouni, *Enslavement as an International Crime*, N.Y.U J. INT'L L. & POL. 445, 445 (1991); Sandhya Drew, *supra* n.49, 481.

<sup>56</sup>*Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case* (U.K. v. Nor.) ICJ Rep. (1951), 116, (Dec. 18) 138; OSCAR SCHACHTER, *supra* n.7, 338; Bruno Simma & Philip Alston, *The Sources of Human Rights Law*, 12 AUSTRALIAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 82, 97 (1992).

<sup>57</sup>*Zafiro*, 6 RIAA 160 (U.K. – U.S. 1925); *Velasquez*, *supra* n.32, ¶166; Keir Starmer, *Positive Obligations Under the Convention* in UNDERSTANDING HUMAN RIGHTS PRINCIPLES 146 (Jeffrey Jowell and Jonathan Cooper eds., 2002).

must intervene in non-government affairs in its territory when slavery is reasonably predictable or suspected,<sup>60</sup> when an individual has sought protection from a government agency,<sup>61</sup> or where the victim is vulnerable to breaches of personal integrity.<sup>62</sup> The Cascadian women sought the protection of the Annolaysian government, yet were ignored [*Compromis* ¶28]. They were also vulnerable to breaches of personal integrity because of their ignorance of the Annolaysian language and culture and their impoverished status [*Compromis* ¶22].

Annolay breached its duty to prevent slavery by failing to enforce its anti-prostitution laws or to monitor the actions of the Company [*Compromis* ¶23]. Annolay also breached its duty to investigate acts of slavery. Investigation must be exhaustive, swift and impartial.<sup>63</sup> Annolay's failure to investigate swiftly and exhaustively, despite the written appeals of the brothel workers [*Compromis* ¶28] and the police officer's knowledge of the situation of 'Heidi F.' [*Compromis* ¶29], evidence a breach of its duty. The blue ribbon panel established by President Contrary [*Compromis* ¶30] has failed to discharge the obligation to investigate because it has not fulfilled its purpose to identify those responsible [*Clarification* ¶9]. Finally, Annolay breached its obligation to prosecute acts of slavery. Annolay has not prosecuted anyone responsible for the

---

<sup>58</sup>*Velasquez supra* n.32, ¶166; *Janes* RIAA 82 (Mex. – U.S. 1926) ¶25; *Godinez Cruz* 1989 Inter-American Court of Human Rights, (Ser.C) No. 5 ¶175; NAOMI ROHT-ARRIAZA, IMMUNITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 39 (1995).

<sup>59</sup>*Velasquez supra* n.32, ¶166; *Janes, supra* n.58 ¶ 25; *Godinez Cruz supra* n.58 ¶175; NAOMI ROHT-ARRIAZA, *supra* n.58, 29.

<sup>60</sup>Rebecca Cook, *State Responsibility for Violation of Women's Human Rights*, 7 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 145, 125 (1994).

<sup>61</sup> Rebecca Cook, *supra* n.60, 125.

<sup>62</sup>*A v UK* (1999) 27 EHRR 611 ¶22.

<sup>63</sup>*Velasquez, supra* n.32 ¶177.

enslavement of women. Annolay cannot escape responsibility for its conduct based on any attribution principle because its omissions, including those of its government agencies and police,<sup>64</sup> are attributable to it.<sup>65</sup>

**C. THE CASCADIAN WOMEN WERE UNDER NO OBLIGATION TO EXHAUST LOCAL REMEDIES**

Individuals are not required to exhaust local remedies before a state may bring an action on their behalf if local remedies are available or effective.<sup>66</sup> There is no evidence that effective remedies were available to the enslaved Cascadian women and the burden lies with Annolay to prove otherwise.<sup>67</sup> There is no evidence that the Annolaysian legal system provided the ethnic Cascadian women with individual rights to obtain redress for the injury they suffered. The purpose of the ‘blue ribbon panel’ was to identify possible offenders involved in the slavery and did not grant any rights to the victims. Even if domestic remedies did exist they were not available to the Cascadian women. The women were held in slavery and therefore could not access potential avenues for any redress. Any complaints the women made to Annolaysian government organs proved ineffective [*Compromis* ¶28] and there is no evidence that Annolay’s investigations will result in the release of ethnic Cascadian women from slavery.

---

<sup>64</sup>*Pugh*, 3 RIAA 1441, 1448 (U.K. – Pan. 1993); *Roper*, 4 RIAA 145 (Mex. – U.S. 1927); *Langdon*, 6 RIAA 325 (U.S. – Pan. 1933); *Cibich*, 4 RIAA 57 (Mex. – U.S. 1926); *ILC State Responsibility*, *supra* n.11, Art.4(2); JAMES CRAWFORD, *supra* n.28, 94.

<sup>65</sup>*Advisory Opinion on Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights*, 1999, ICJ (Apr. 29) ¶62; *ILC State Responsibility*, *supra* n.11, Art.4; OPPENHEIM’S *supra* n.2, §165; CHITTHARANJAN AMERASINGHE, STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURIES TO ALIENS 38 (1967).

<sup>66</sup>*Altesor v Uruguay* (1982) 70 I.L.R. 248, 253; *ILC State Responsibility*, *supra* n.11, Art.44(b); JAMES CRAWFORD *supra* n.28, 265; OSCAR SCHACHTER, *supra* n.7 213-14.

<sup>67</sup>*Greece v UK*, I.L.R. 25 (1958-I) 27, 29; AA CACADO TRINDADE, THE APPLICATION OF THE RULE OF EXHAUSTION OF LOCAL REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 134 & 146 (1983).

### **III. RESTON IS ENTITLED TO EXERCISE UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION OVER FRED SCHMANDEFARE ('SCHMANDEFARE')**

International law is founded on the sovereign equality of all states.<sup>68</sup> Reston's sovereignty permits it to exercise jurisdiction as it sees fit, unless it is restricted from doing so by international law. Annolay bears the burden of proving customary norms exist to limit Reston's sovereignty.<sup>69</sup>

#### **A. RESTON MAY EXERCISE UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION OVER CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY**

States may use the principle of universality to obtain jurisdiction over an alleged offender whose crime is of such gravity and magnitude that it offends all humankind.<sup>70</sup> Numerous offences, including crimes against humanity, have been recognised to give rise to universal jurisdiction.<sup>71</sup> Crimes against humanity are of a peculiarly universal character vesting in every state the authority to prosecute anyone who participated in their commission.<sup>72</sup> Reston is legally permitted to exercise universal jurisdiction over Schmandefare and to prosecute him on behalf of the international community for any offence that constitutes a crime against humanity.

#### **B. TRAFFICKING FOR THE PURPOSE OF SEXUAL SLAVERY IS A CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY**

Trafficking is the movement of people across borders with the use of threat, violence or

---

<sup>68</sup>CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS 1945, Art.2(1).

<sup>69</sup>*North Sea Continental Shelf* *supra* n.50 ¶77.

<sup>70</sup>*Attorney General of Israel v Eichmann*, 36 I.L.R. 277 (Sup.Ct. Israel 1962) ('*Eichmann*'); ANTONIO CASSESE, *supra* n.7, 262; STEVEN RATNER & JASON ABRAMS, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ATROCITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 161 (2001); M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, *supra* n.19, 229.

<sup>71</sup>M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, *supra* n.19, 240; OSCAR SCHACHTER, *supra* n.7, 267; STEVEN RATNER & JASON ABRAMS, *supra* n.70, 162; John Murphy, *International crimes in THE UNITED NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW* 375 (Christopher Joyner ed. 1997).

<sup>72</sup>*Eichmann*, *supra* n.70.

coercion.<sup>73</sup> It has recently been recognised as a crime against humanity in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.<sup>74</sup> This classification is confirmed by the nature of trafficking. Crimes against humanity are serious acts that are harmful to human beings because they strike down what is most essential to them: their life, liberty, physical welfare, health or dignity.<sup>75</sup> Trafficking has the same effects, particularly when it is committed for the purpose of sexual slavery.

Alternatively, trafficking is a form of slavery.<sup>76</sup> Slavery is a recognised crime against humanity<sup>77</sup> that occurs where an entity exercises rights of ownership over an individual.<sup>78</sup> Traffickers inevitably exercise rights of ownership over victims because they control the removal, transfer and destination of the victims. Often the victims cannot escape the control of their traffickers because of financial dependence, fear and physical restraint. Trafficking for the purpose of sexual slavery is slavery, because the victims are ultimately forced into situations where others exercise rights of ownership over them.

---

<sup>73</sup>TRANSNATIONAL ORGANISED CRIME CONVENTION 2000, Art.3; CONVENTION FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF THE TRAFFIC IN PERSONS AND OF THE EXPLOITATION OF THE PROSTITUTION OF OTHERS 1949, Art.1; G.A. RES 49/166, ¶8, U.N. Doc. A/50/369 (1995); KELLY ASKIN & DOREAN KOEING, WOMEN AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 202 (1999).

<sup>74</sup>ROME STATUTE, *supra* n.12, Art.7(2)(c).

<sup>75</sup>*Erdemovic Sentencing Judgement* Trial Chamber I, Nov. 29 1996] ¶28.

<sup>76</sup>ROME STATUTE, *supra* n.12 Art.7(2)(c); M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, *supra* n.19, 454.

<sup>77</sup>CHARTER OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 1945, Art.6(c); CHARTER OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST 1946, Art.5(c); ICTY STATUTE, *supra* n.12, Art.5(c); ICTR STATUTE, *supra* n.12 Art.3(c); ROME STATUTE, *supra* n.12, Art.7(2)(c); M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, *supra* n.19, 215.

<sup>78</sup>SLAVERY CONVENTION, *supra* n.48; SUPPLEMENTARY SLAVERY CONVENTION, *supra* n.48; STEVEN RATNER & JASON ABRAMS, *supra* n.70, 112.

**C. RESTON MAY EXERCISE UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION OVER SCHMANDEFARE *IN ABSENTIA***

States may utilise universal jurisdiction to prosecute an individual accused of an international crime irrespective of whether the individual is in their custody.<sup>79</sup> The purpose of universal jurisdiction is to prosecute individuals who have committed crimes that are universally condemned.<sup>80</sup> Therefore, custody of the offender does not impact upon the purpose of the universality principle. This court recently confirmed that the exercise of universal jurisdiction *in absentia* is not a violation of international law.<sup>81</sup> The alleged offence of Schmandefare is one that is deeply offensive and harmful to the international community. Reston is permitted to prosecute Schmandefare using universal jurisdiction regardless of the fact that he is not in its custody.

**IV. RESTON HAS ACTED CONSISTENTLY WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW WITH RESPECT TO THE BRIBERY AND NEED NOT MAKE RESTITUTION**

Annolaysians did not only instigate the transfer of Cascadian women into Annolay, but also the transfer of Restonian children. Annolay is claiming restitution for bribes paid to Restonian border officials by Annolaysian adoptive parents, but it has no basis for such a claim in international law.

**A. ANNOLAY'S UNCLEAN HANDS RENDER THIS ACTION INADMISSABLE**

A state's involvement in illegal acts in international law prevents the state from claiming

---

<sup>79</sup>Spain: LAW ON JUDICIAL POWERS 1985, Art.23; Belgium: The LAW OF 16 JUN. 1993 and the LAW OF 19 FEB. 1999, Art.7; Italy: ITALIAN CRIMINAL CODE 1930, Art.7.5; ANTONIO CASSESE, *supra* n.7, 26.

<sup>80</sup>MARTIN DIXON & ROBERT MCCORQUODALE, CASE & MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 304 (3<sup>rd</sup> ed. 2000); M. Cherif Bassiouni, *Universal jurisdiction for international crimes: historical perspectives and contemporary practice*, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 82, 88 (2001).

<sup>81</sup>*Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000* (the Congo v. Belg.) ICJ General list No.21, 14 Feb 2002 (Dis. Op. Judge Oda; Dis. Op. Judge Van den Wyngaert; Joint Sep. Op. Judges Higgins, Kooijmans & Buergenthal).



redress. This is known as the ‘clean hands doctrine’ and it is supported by judicial decisions<sup>82</sup> and publicists.<sup>83</sup> Annolay failed to prevent the illegal removal and retention of Restonian children and thus acted unlawfully. Its claim is therefore inadmissible under the clean hands doctrine.

States have a customary obligation to prevent the illegal removal or retention of children.<sup>84</sup> Removal of children is illegal where an entity’s custodial rights over a child are violated without the entity’s consent. Reston had custodial rights over the children removed from its territory because they were orphans [*Compromis* ¶9] and thus wards of the state.<sup>85</sup> Reston’s custodial rights were breached as children were removed without its consent [*Compromis* ¶13]. Annolay took no action whatsoever to determine whether Restonian children entering its territory were illegally removed [*Compromis* ¶13] or to ensure that illegally removed children were

---

<sup>82</sup>*Nicaragua* (Merits)(Nicar. v. U.S.) 1984, ICJ 1 (Nov. 26) ¶ 268 (Dis. Op. Judge Schwebel); *Tehran Hostages* (Merits)(U.S. v. Iran) 1980, ICJ 1, 53(Dis. Op. Judge Morozov) 62(Dis. Op. Judge Tarazi); *Diversion of Water from the Meuse* (Neth. v. Belg.) 1937 PCIJ Ser. A/B No. 70, 50 (Dis. Op. Judge Anzilotti) 77(Dis. Op. Judge Hudson); *Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions* (Greece v. U.K.) 1925 PCIJ Ser. A, No. 5, 50; *Legal Status of Eastern Greenland* PCIJ Ser. A/B No. 53, 95; *Lawrence*, Hornby’s Report 397, 398 (Mex.-U.S. Cl. Comm. 1855); see *Chorzów supra* n.39, 31; *Medea and the Good Return*, 3 Int. Arb. 2 730, 2 731 (Gren.-U.S. Cl. Comm. 1857); *Pelletier*, 2 Int. Arb., 1749, 1750 (Haiti-U.S. Cl. Trib.); *I’m Alone*, 3 RIAA 1609, 1618 (Can.-U.S. 1935).

<sup>83</sup>IAN BROWNLIE, *supra* n.2, 508; BIN CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 155 (1958); ELIZABETH ZOLLER, PEACETIME UNILATERAL REMEDIES 16-17, 1984; Gerald Fitzmaurice, *The General Principles of International law* in 92 COLLECTED COURSES, ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 119 (1957); Oscar Schacter, *International Law in the Hostage Crisis* in AMERICAN HOSTAGES IN IRAN, 344 (WARREN CHRISTOPHER et al. 1985).

<sup>84</sup>See CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD 1990, Art.11(1) & 35 [‘CRC’]; THE HAGUE CONVENTION ON THE CIVIL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION 1980, Art.3(a); DECLARATION AND LEGAL PRINCIPLES RELATING TO THE PROTECTION AND WELFARE OF CHILDREN, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO FOSTER PLACEMENT AND ADOPTION NATIONALLY AND INTERNATIONALLY 1986, Art.19.

<sup>85</sup>George Curtis, *The Checkered Career of Parens Patriae* 25 DEPAUL L. REV. 896 (1976).

returned to Reston. Annolay therefore breached its customary obligation to prevent the illegal removal or retention of children, and consequently its claim regarding the bribery is inadmissible.

**B. RESTON ACTED CONSISTENTLY WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW WITH RESPECT TO THE BRIBERY**

**1. The conduct of the Restonian border officials is not attributable to Reston**

The conduct of minor officials is not attributable to the state merely because they are agents of the state.<sup>86</sup> Where minor officials act in their private capacity their conduct is not attributable to the state.<sup>87</sup> The particular circumstances of each case must be considered when determining the capacity of any individual official.<sup>88</sup> Officials motivated by personal profit act in their private capacity.<sup>89</sup> The Restonian border officials kept the proceeds of the bribes for themselves [*Clarifications ¶5*], so their conduct is not attributable to Reston.

In any event, the conduct of minor officials is not attributable to the state where the conduct falls outside their apparent authority.<sup>90</sup> Restonian border officials were not authorised to exact money unlawfully and acted without the approval of the Restonian government

---

<sup>86</sup>*ILC State Responsibility, supra* n.11, Art.7.

<sup>87</sup>*Mallen*, 4 RIAA 173, 174-175 (Mex. – U.S. 1927); *Castelain*, 3 MOORE’S 2999, 3000 (U.S. – Fr. 1880); *Bensley*, 3 MOORE’S 3018; *Caire*, 5 RIAA 516, 531 (Fr. – Mex. 1929); *Donougho*, 3 MOORE’S 3012, 3013 (Mex.-U.S. 1868); *Lewis*, 3 MOORE’S 3019, 3020 (U.S.-Gr. Brit. 1871); OPPENHEIM’S *supra* n.2 §165; CHITTHARANJAN AMERASINGHE, *supra* n.65, 53.

<sup>88</sup>JAMES CRAWFORD, *supra* n.28, 99.

<sup>89</sup>*See Yeager*, 17 IRAN-U.S. CL. TRIB. REP 92, 111 (1987).

<sup>90</sup>REBECCA WALLACE, *INTERNATIONAL LAW* 177 (3<sup>rd</sup> ed. 1997); CHITTHARANJAN AMERASINGHE, *supra* n.65, 53; IAN BROWNLIE, *SYSTEM OF THE LAW OF NATIONS, STATE RESPONSIBILITY (PART1)* 145 (1983); Theodor Meron, *International Responsibility of States for Unauthorized Acts of their Officials*, 33 B.Y.B.L. 85, 104 (1957); Jiminez Arechega, *International Responsibility*, in *MANUAL OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW*, 548 (1968).

[*Compromis* ¶13]. The bribery of Annolaysian parents therefore fell outside the apparent authority of the border officials and is not attributable to Reston.

**2. Reston has upheld the object and purpose of the Regional Anti-Corruption Convention [RACC]**

Signatories have an obligation not to defeat the object and purpose of a treaty before it enters into force.<sup>91</sup> The object and purpose of a treaty is defeated when a signatory's conduct is intended<sup>92</sup> to do so. The purpose of the RACC is to prevent and prohibit corruption.<sup>93</sup> Reston never intended to defeat the object and purpose of the RACC but instead demonstrated good faith by permanently reassigning border officials implicated in the bribery [*Compromis* ¶17].

Furthermore, a failure to act immediately to requests for investigation does not completely defeat the object and purpose of the RACC, especially when Reston's delicate, post-conflict status is considered [*Compromis* ¶15]. Consequently, the failure of Reston to respond immediately to information regarding the exaction of bribes by a small number of Restonian officials does not evidence the state's intention to defeat the object and purpose of the entire RACC.<sup>94</sup>

**3. Reston fulfilled its obligation to exercise due diligence to protect the rights of aliens within its territory**

States have a duty to protect the rights of other states and the rights of aliens within their

---

<sup>91</sup>VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 1969, Art.18.

<sup>92</sup>SAMUEL CRANDALL, TREATIES: THEIR MAKING AND ENFORCEMENT 48 (1916); ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 94 (2000); MERVYN JONES, FULL POWERS AND RATIFICATION: A STUDY OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF TREATY- MAKING PROCEDURE 70 (1949).

<sup>93</sup>REGIONAL ANTI-CORRUPTION CONVENTION 1999, preamble ¶4, 3 & 6 ['RACC'].

<sup>94</sup>See ANTHONY AUST, *supra* n.92, 94; MERVYN JONES, *supra* n.92, 71.

territories in customary international law.<sup>95</sup> States only breach this duty if they do not exercise due diligence to discharge it.<sup>96</sup> This can only be proven if every reasonable and impartial person would recognise measures that a state takes as insufficient.<sup>97</sup> Reston took reasonable steps to discharge its obligation by permanently reassigning border officials implicated in the bribery and it therefore did not breach it [*Compromis* ¶17].

#### 4. There is no customary law to prevent the bribery of public officials

For customary international law to be established, rigorous conformity of state practice is required.<sup>98</sup> State practice preventing bribery of public officials is inconsistent<sup>99</sup> in its criminalisation of active and passive bribery,<sup>100</sup> the size and type of bribes prohibited<sup>101</sup> and the

---

<sup>95</sup>*Island of Palmas*, (1928) 2 RIAA 829 (Perm. Ct. Arb, 1928), 831; *Electronica Sicula* (U.S. v. Ital.) 1989, ICJ 15 ¶ 65; IAN BROWNLIE, *supra* n.90, 162; RICHARD LILICH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURIES TO ALIENS 7 (1983); CHITTHARANJAN AMERASINGHE, *supra* n.65, 281-282; Riccardo Pisillo-Mazzei, *The Due Diligence Rule and the Nature of the International Responsibility of States*, in STATE RESPONSIBILITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 110 (René Provost ed., 2002).

<sup>96</sup>*Wipperman*, 3 Moore's 3039, 3041 (Caracas-U.S. 1868); *Sevey*, 4 RIAA 474 (Mex.-U.S. 1929); *Boyd*, 4 RIAA 380 (Mex.-U.S. 1928); *Mead*, 4 RIAA 653 (Mex.-U.S. 1930); *Kennedy*, 4 RIAA 194 (Mex.-U.S. 1927); *Smith*, 4 RIAA 469 (Mex.-U.S. 1929); *Ermerins*, 4 RIAA 476 (Mex.-U.S. 1929); *Cibich*, *supra* n.64, 58; *Mallen*, *supra* n.87, 173; *Mills*, 3 Moore 3033, 3034 (Mex.-U.S. 1870); *Chapman*, 4 RIAA 632 (Mex.-U.S. 1930).

<sup>97</sup>*Neer*, 4 RIAA 60, ¶4 (Mex-US 1926).

<sup>98</sup>*Nicaragua* *supra* n.1, ¶186; *North Sea* *supra* n.50, ¶74; OPPENHEIM'S *supra* n.2, §27; ANTONIO CASSESE, *supra* n.7, 119.

<sup>99</sup>W PAATII OFOSU-AMAAH, et al., COMBATING CORRUPTION 7 (1999); MICHAEL REISMAN FOLDED LIES 63 (1979); M CLINARD & D ABBOTT, CRIME IN THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 53 (1974); R WRAITH & E SIMPKINS CORRUPTION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 51 (1973); Leon Sheleff, *International White Collar Crime in WHITE COLLAR & ECONOMIC CRIMES* 51 (Peter Wickman ed. 1980).

<sup>100</sup>*Compare* RACC *supra* n.93 Art.3 with ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT CONVENTION ON COMBATING BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTION 1997, Art.1('OECD BRIBERY CONVENTION').

type of public officials liable.<sup>102</sup> The inconsistency in state practice is further evidenced by the lack of legislation prohibiting bribery in developing states.<sup>103</sup> This distinct lack of consistent state practice negates the existence of a customary obligation to prevent bribery of public officials. In any event, Reston did not breach any obligation requiring it to prevent bribery for the same reasons as it did not breach its obligations to prevent injury to aliens [*see* §IV:B:3].

#### **5. Reston satisfied any obligation to prevent violations of children's rights**

If Reston was required to take action to prevent the illegal removal of children or other similar conduct, it satisfied its obligation. Obligations concerning children must be interpreted in light of the child's best interests.<sup>104</sup> Reston consistently acted in the best interests of the children and thus did not breach any obligation regarding its treatment of the children. Reston provided facilities to care for orphaned children as best it could after the civil war [*Compromis* ¶9]. It also compelled prospective adoptive parents of Restonian children to attend fitness interviews and to obtain certificates of fitness before they were able to adopt a Restonian child [*Compromis* ¶11]. Finally, Reston reassigned the border officials implicated in bribery [*Compromis* ¶17] in order to prevent further illegal removal of Restonian children. These facts indicate that Reston acted in

---

<sup>101</sup> Compare UK: PUBLIC BODIES CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 1889, §7 with Tanzania: PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION ACT §2 and Malawi: CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 1995, §3; EXPLANATORY REPORT OF COUNCIL OF EUROPE CRIMINAL LAW CONVENTION 1999, ¶2.

<sup>102</sup> Compare RACC *supra* n.93, Art.1a and COUNCIL OF EUROPE CRIMINAL LAW CONVENTION 1999, Art.1a with OECD BRIBERY CONVENTION *supra* n.100, Art.4a.

<sup>103</sup> L. Allnutt, J. Druker and J., *Regional Reports- Commonwealth of Independent States, Transparency International* 116 (2002); US Dept. of State, *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices* 2000, available at <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2000/> (last visited Jan. 20 2003); Gitau Warigi, REGIONAL REPORTS- EAST AND EAST-CENTRAL AFRICA, TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL 70 (2002); J.H. Ntabgoba *New People* (Kenya) April 1 2001.

<sup>104</sup> CRC, *supra* n.84, Art.3(1).

the best interest of Restonian children and thus it could not have breached any of its obligations regarding children.

**C. RESTON IS NOT OBLIGATED TO MAKE REPARATIONS TO ANNOLAY**

The consequence of an internationally wrongful act is that a state must make reparations to any other state that suffers injury<sup>105</sup> for which the wrongful act is the proximate cause.<sup>106</sup> Any wilful or negligent contribution to the injury suffered by either the victims or the state itself must be taken into account.<sup>107</sup> Such contribution negates or reduces any reparations owed.<sup>108</sup>

Annolaysian adoptive parents with certificates of fitness negligently contributed to their injury because they knew of their legal right to return to Annolay with their child. Annolaysian nationals without certificates of fitness wilfully contributed to their injury because they knew they could not cross the border without a certificate of fitness and therefore the only way of returning to Annolay with their child was to pay bribes to border officials [*Compromis* ¶13].

Annolay seeks reparations for the bribes exacted from its nationals in the form of restitution [*Compromis* ¶41]. Restitution may not be awarded, however, if it would result in a burden disproportionate to the benefit derived.<sup>109</sup> This burden includes threats to political

---

<sup>105</sup>*Chorzów supra* n.39, 20; *ILC State Responsibility, supra* n.11, Art.31; CHRISTINE GRAY, *supra* n.39, 79; IAN BROWNLIE, *supra* n.2, 460.

<sup>106</sup>DINAH SHELTON, *supra* n.40, 101; J.H.W. VERZIJL, *supra* n.40, 735; LOUIS HENKIN et al. *supra* n.40, 758.

<sup>107</sup>*ILC State Responsibility, supra* n.11, Art.39; JAMES CRAWFORD, *supra* n.28, 232.

<sup>108</sup>DINAH SHELTON, *supra* n.40, 94; CHRISTINE GRAY, *supra* n.39, 23; IAN BROWNLIE, *supra* n.2, 508; JAMES CRAWFORD, *supra* n.28, 240-41; LOUIS HENKIN et. al. *supra* n.40, 757.

<sup>109</sup>*ILC State Responsibility, supra* n.11, Art.35.

independence or the economic stability of a state.<sup>110</sup> Reston is a developing state with a devastated economy [*Compromis* ¶8]. To provide restitution to the Annolaysian adoptive parents would require Reston to locate every implicated border official and every Annolaysian national. The administrative and economic burden this would place on Reston is disproportionate to any benefit derived by the Annolaysian parents. Compensation may not be awarded as an alternative because Annolay did not request it.<sup>111</sup>

### **CONCLUSION AND PRAYER FOR RELIEF**

For the foregoing reasons, the Republic of Reston respectfully requests that this Court:

DECLARE that Reston acted lawfully regarding the treatment of ethnic Cascadian women  
during the civil war and is not liable to pay Annolay damages;

DECLARE that Annolay violated international law regarding the treatment of Cascadian women  
working in Annolaysian brothels;

DECLARE that Reston is entitled to exercise universal jurisdiction over Mr. Fred Schmandefare;  
and

DECLARE that Reston acted lawfully regarding the bribes exacted by its border officials and is  
not liable to repay them.

---

<sup>110</sup>JAMES CRAWFORD, *supra* n.28, 7 & 217; J.H.W. VERZIIL, *supra* n.40 744; See Diane Orentlicher, *Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a Prior Regime*, 100 YALE L.J. 2537, 2600 (1991).

<sup>111</sup>See *Corfu Channel* (U.K. v. Alban.)(Assessment of Compensation)(244) ICJ Rep. 1949, 301.

